31 research outputs found

    Towards trustworthy social computing systems

    Get PDF
    The rising popularity of social computing systems has managed to attract rampant forms of service abuse that negatively affects the sustainability of these systems and degrades the quality of service experienced by their users. The main factor that enables service abuse is the weak identity infrastructure used by most sites, where identities are easy to create with no verification by a trusted authority. Attackers are exploiting this infrastructure to launch Sybil attacks, where they create multiple fake (Sybil) identities to take advantage of the combined privileges associated with the identities to abuse the system. In this thesis, we present techniques to mitigate service abuse by designing and building defense schemes that are robust and practical. We use two broad defense strategies: (1) Leveraging the social network: We first analyze existing social network-based Sybil detection schemes and present their practical limitations when applied on real world social networks. Next, we present an approach called Sybil Tolerance that bounds the impact an attacker can gain from using multiple identities; (2) Leveraging activity history of identities: We present two approaches, one that applies anomaly detection on user social behavior to detect individual misbehaving identities, and a second approach called Stamper that focuses on detecting a group of Sybil identities. We show that both approaches in this category raise the bar for defense against adaptive attackers.Die steigende PopularitĂ€t sozialer Medien fĂŒhrt zu umfangreichen Missbrauch mit negativen Folgen fĂŒr die nachhaltige FunktionalitĂ€t und verringerter QualitĂ€t des Services. Der Missbrauch wird maßgeblich durch die Nutzung schwacher Identifikationsverfahren, die eine einfache Anmeldung ohne Verifikation durch eine vertrauenswĂŒrdige Behörde erlaubt, ermöglicht. Angreifer nutzen diese Umgebung aus und attackieren den Service mit sogenannten Sybil Angriffen, bei denen mehrere gefĂ€lschte (Sybil) IdentitĂ€ten erstellt werden, um einen Vorteil durch die gemeinsamen Privilegien der IdentitĂ€ten zu erhalten und den Service zu missbrauchen. Diese Doktorarbeit zeigt Techniken zur Verhinderung von Missbrauch sozialer Medien, in dem Verteidigungsmechanismen konstruiert und implementiert werden, die sowohl robust als auch praktikabel sind. Zwei Verteidigungsstrategien werden vorgestellt: (1) Unter Ausnutzung des sozialen Netzwerks: Wir analysieren zuerst existierende soziale Netzwerk-basierende Sybil Erkennungsmechanismen und zeigen deren praktische Anwendungsgrenzen auf bei der Anwendung auf soziale Netzwerke aus der echten Welt. Im Anschluss zeigen wir den Ansatz der sogenannten Sybil Toleranz, welcher die Folgen eines Angriffs mit mehreren IdentitĂ€ten einschrĂ€nkt. (2) Unter Ausnutzung des AktivitĂ€tsverlaufs von IdentitĂ€ten: Wir prĂ€sentieren zwei AnsĂ€tze, einen anwendbar fĂŒr die Erkennung von UnregelmĂ€ĂŸigkeiten in dem sozialen Verhalten eines Benutzers zur Erkennung unanstĂ€ndiger Benutzer und ein weiterer Ansatz namens Stamper, dessen Fokus die Erkennung von Gruppen bestehend aus Sybil IdentitĂ€ten ist. Beide gezeigten AnsĂ€tze erschweren adaptive Angriffe und verbessern existierende Verteidigungsmechanismen

    Towards trustworthy social computing systems

    Get PDF
    The rising popularity of social computing systems has managed to attract rampant forms of service abuse that negatively affects the sustainability of these systems and degrades the quality of service experienced by their users. The main factor that enables service abuse is the weak identity infrastructure used by most sites, where identities are easy to create with no verification by a trusted authority. Attackers are exploiting this infrastructure to launch Sybil attacks, where they create multiple fake (Sybil) identities to take advantage of the combined privileges associated with the identities to abuse the system. In this thesis, we present techniques to mitigate service abuse by designing and building defense schemes that are robust and practical. We use two broad defense strategies: (1) Leveraging the social network: We first analyze existing social network-based Sybil detection schemes and present their practical limitations when applied on real world social networks. Next, we present an approach called Sybil Tolerance that bounds the impact an attacker can gain from using multiple identities; (2) Leveraging activity history of identities: We present two approaches, one that applies anomaly detection on user social behavior to detect individual misbehaving identities, and a second approach called Stamper that focuses on detecting a group of Sybil identities. We show that both approaches in this category raise the bar for defense against adaptive attackers.Die steigende PopularitĂ€t sozialer Medien fĂŒhrt zu umfangreichen Missbrauch mit negativen Folgen fĂŒr die nachhaltige FunktionalitĂ€t und verringerter QualitĂ€t des Services. Der Missbrauch wird maßgeblich durch die Nutzung schwacher Identifikationsverfahren, die eine einfache Anmeldung ohne Verifikation durch eine vertrauenswĂŒrdige Behörde erlaubt, ermöglicht. Angreifer nutzen diese Umgebung aus und attackieren den Service mit sogenannten Sybil Angriffen, bei denen mehrere gefĂ€lschte (Sybil) IdentitĂ€ten erstellt werden, um einen Vorteil durch die gemeinsamen Privilegien der IdentitĂ€ten zu erhalten und den Service zu missbrauchen. Diese Doktorarbeit zeigt Techniken zur Verhinderung von Missbrauch sozialer Medien, in dem Verteidigungsmechanismen konstruiert und implementiert werden, die sowohl robust als auch praktikabel sind. Zwei Verteidigungsstrategien werden vorgestellt: (1) Unter Ausnutzung des sozialen Netzwerks: Wir analysieren zuerst existierende soziale Netzwerk-basierende Sybil Erkennungsmechanismen und zeigen deren praktische Anwendungsgrenzen auf bei der Anwendung auf soziale Netzwerke aus der echten Welt. Im Anschluss zeigen wir den Ansatz der sogenannten Sybil Toleranz, welcher die Folgen eines Angriffs mit mehreren IdentitĂ€ten einschrĂ€nkt. (2) Unter Ausnutzung des AktivitĂ€tsverlaufs von IdentitĂ€ten: Wir prĂ€sentieren zwei AnsĂ€tze, einen anwendbar fĂŒr die Erkennung von UnregelmĂ€ĂŸigkeiten in dem sozialen Verhalten eines Benutzers zur Erkennung unanstĂ€ndiger Benutzer und ein weiterer Ansatz namens Stamper, dessen Fokus die Erkennung von Gruppen bestehend aus Sybil IdentitĂ€ten ist. Beide gezeigten AnsĂ€tze erschweren adaptive Angriffe und verbessern existierende Verteidigungsmechanismen

    Understanding and Specifying Social Access Control Lists

    Get PDF
    Online social network (OSN) users upload millions of pieces of contenttoshare with otherseveryday. While asignificant portionofthiscontentis benign(andistypicallysharedwith all friends or all OSN users), there are certain pieces of content that are highly privacy sensitive. Sharing such sensitive content raises significant privacy concerns for users, and it becomes important for the user to protect this content from being exposed to the wrong audience. Today, most OSN services provide fine-grained mechanisms for specifying social access control lists (social ACLs, or SACLs), allowing users to restrict their sensitive content to a select subset of their friends. However, it remains unclear how these SACL mechanisms are used today. To design better privacy management tools for users, we need to first understand the usage and complexity of SACLs specified by users. In this paper, we present the first large-scale study of finegrained privacy preferences of over 1,000 users on Facebook, providing us with the first ground-truth information on how users specify SACLs on a social networking service. Overall, we find that a surprisingly large fraction (17.6%) of content is shared with SACLs. However, we also find that the SACL membership shows little correlation with either profile information or social network links; as a result, it is difficult to predict the subset of a user’s friends likely to appear in a SACL. On the flip side, we find that SACLs are often reused, suggesting that simply making recent SACLs available to users is likely tosignificantly reduce the burdenof privacy management on users. 1

    Jekyll: Attacking Medical Image Diagnostics using Deep Generative Models

    Full text link
    Advances in deep neural networks (DNNs) have shown tremendous promise in the medical domain. However, the deep learning tools that are helping the domain, can also be used against it. Given the prevalence of fraud in the healthcare domain, it is important to consider the adversarial use of DNNs in manipulating sensitive data that is crucial to patient healthcare. In this work, we present the design and implementation of a DNN-based image translation attack on biomedical imagery. More specifically, we propose Jekyll, a neural style transfer framework that takes as input a biomedical image of a patient and translates it to a new image that indicates an attacker-chosen disease condition. The potential for fraudulent claims based on such generated 'fake' medical images is significant, and we demonstrate successful attacks on both X-rays and retinal fundus image modalities. We show that these attacks manage to mislead both medical professionals and algorithmic detection schemes. Lastly, we also investigate defensive measures based on machine learning to detect images generated by Jekyll.Comment: Published in proceedings of the 5th European Symposium on Security and Privacy (EuroS&P '20

    A Network Clustering Algorithm for Sybil-Attack Resisting

    No full text

    Keeping information safe from social networking apps

    No full text
    The ability of third-party applications to aggregate and repurpose personal data is a fundamental privacy weakness in today’s social networking platforms. Prior work has proposed sandboxingin a hostedcloud infrastructuretoprevent leakage of user information [22]. In this paper, we extend simple sandboxing to allow sharing of information among friends in a social network, and to help application developers securely aggregate user data according to differential privacy properties. Enabling these two key features requires preventing, among other subtleties, a new“KevinBacon”attack aimed at aggregating private data through a social network graph. We describe the significant architectural and security implications for the application framework in the Web (JavaScript) application, backend cloud, and user data handling
    corecore